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THE DEVELOPMENT OF SEARCH AND SEIZURE LAW
IN PUBLIC SCHOOLS

Bill 0. Heder*

I. INTRODUCTION
One day in the fall of 1994, I turned around and found that
my twin boys were suddenly old enough to attend elementary
school. Central Elementary, the closest school (and thus the
school of choice) was located just four blocks down our street
and was staffed mostly with people I knew who were graduates
of the local university. In anticipation of our inevitable P.T.A.
membership, my wife and I discussed for the first time the type
of school environment our children were likely to encounter,
and how we felt about it.
Our discussion was perhaps typical of young parents in
small-town America. We talked briefly of the quality of the
instruction and facilities. With a cynical acceptance of the fact
that grade-schoolers were bound to wear out pants, shoes, and
the occasional elbow or collar bone, student health and safety
were almost non-issues to us. Obviously, we were not aware
that elsewhere, in school districts throughout the United
States, schools were initiating canine drug search policies in
classrooms and halls, and still others were executing random
drug testing among high school athletes.
It has been said that we live in a country made of communities where our neighborhood school may have been built in the
Kodachrome years of World War II, or where the shiny new
school is funded by our increased property taxes. We live close
enough to hear the roaring crowds at the local high school football games from our back porch. We wear hats and jackets promoting the band or baseball programs.
It seems counter-intuitive, if not un-American, to react to
increased regulation in our local school with home schooling.
* Bill 0. Heder, B.F.A. Brigham Young University, 1991, J.D. Brigham Young University,
1998. Member, Utah Bar. Associate, Hill, Johnson & Schmutz, P.C., Provo, Utah.
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Similarly, there is something un-neighborly about secreting our
children away to private school because of book bag checks at
the local public school. Having said so, it is hardly deniable that
the increased regulation of public schools impinges on a common nerve of parents nation-wide; it seems to constitute a surrender of part ofwho we are and where we came from.
It is likely that the perceived loss arises from a cumulative
estimation of what public education should be and what children need and deserve. We have definite ideas about what
growing up in America should be. Perhaps it is the threat to
these ideas that most begs the question, "What do we expect
from public education, and at what price?" Analysis of the Supreme Court's decisions affecting public schools reveals a special sensitivity to the unique issues of children, regardless of
their age. However, that sensitivity is at best only a partial
explanation for the decisions that have come from that Court.
A continued search necessarily embraces an innumerable
set of factors which directly and indirectly propel the condition
and the social contribution of public education in the United
States. This paper traces just one critical influence in that
equation: the law of search and seizure under the Fourth
Amendment. 1 This narrow focus stems from the idea that in the
context of public education's goals and limitations, the issue of
search and seizure among students may indicate a crippling of
public education's posture, and doubts about its future contribution to society.
In addressing the legal issue of search and seizure in public
schools, this article provides an accurate perspective from
which the reader may better analyze the current state of the
applicable law. Substantial discussion will be devoted to providing a historical context for the pivotal court decisions related to
this issue. From the perspective gained in this analysis, a set of
elemental arguments will be identified consisting of principles
recognized and then applied by the Supreme Court in decisions
throughout the twentieth century.
These arguments will be presented and analyzed under the
recognition that the same principles will determine the future
course of search and seizure in public schools. Court holdings

1. U.S. CONST. amend IV.
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will be scrutinized as indicia of our changing societal view of
children's individual liberties. Administrative reactions to those
decisions will be considered as predicates to future policy. In
the end, it is hoped that the reader will feel not only primed but
compelled to ask and answer the seminal question: "What do I
expect from public education, and at what price?"

II. PRIVACY UNDER THE FOURTH AMENDMENT
As is often the case with beginnings weighted in social consequence, there are a multitude of factors which led to a judicial
recognition of students' right to privacy in public school. The
constitutional basis for our law dictates that recognition begins
with several significant interpretations of the protective language of the Fourth Amendment. The application of that language by case law to various areas of our society makes up the
history of students' rights to privacy under search and seizure
law.

A. THE PROBLEM OF INTERPRETATION
To state that the Fourth Amendment prohibits "unreasonable searches and seizures" by the government is the truth, but
hardly the whole truth. 2 For rather than removing uncertainty
about privacy rights in citizens, that language begs two immediate questions of interpretation: what is meant by "government" and what is meant by "unreasonable?" In turn, the answers to those queries lead to more questioning, and the analysis of a constitutional search has begun.
The first question of whether a given search is a government act is a revealing query. With this first question comes a
realization that there are more searches which do not trigger
Fourth Amendment scrutiny than those which do. The everyday
example of a father's search of his teenager's room is much
more common than police searches, and yet the father's search
does not qualify for Fourth Amendment protections. However,
in order for police officers or agents to search the boy's room,

2. U.S. CONST. amend IV: "The right of the people to be secure in their
persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall
not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by
Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the
persons or things to be seized."
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they must produce a valid and detailed warrant, supported by
affidavits showing probable cause. Such a process necessarily
and intentionally limits the frequency and scope of government
searches.
In critiquing search and seizure issues as applied to the
public school environment, one must focus on the school official
as a government actor (rather than the police), and must analyze what safeguards are in place to protect individual privacy
from his or her search. Focusing on a discrete set of contributing cases is necessary because the majority of decisions dealing
with issues in public schools, other than the Fourth Amendment, can be set aside as either distractive to the issue of student privacy or redundant to lesser points. 3

3. A sampling of the broad range of decisions relating to student rights in
public schools: In Foley v. Benedict, 55 S.W.2d 805 (1932), the court held that
students were not entitled to a hearing for academic dismissal. That decision would
later be supported by the Supreme Court in Regents of University of Michigan v.
Ewing, 474 U.S. 214 (1985), where the Court upheld the dichotomy between academic
and disciplinary dismissal as to due process protections. The Seventh Circuit, Scoville
v. Board of Education. of Joliet Twp., 425 F.2d 10 (7th Cir. 1970), held that a student
underground paper called "Grass High" could not be censored by administration. A
much earlier case, Minersville School District. v. Gobitis, 310 U.S. 586 (1940)
(overruled by West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943),
had supported school administrative restrictions upon students' rights to free speech
arguably not nearly as "inappropriate" as the Scoville example. Although the school
administration, had labeled the student paper "inappropriate" and "indecent", the
expelled members of the student staff won the lawsuit. Going the other direction, the
Sixth Circuit sided with the school officials in Guzick v. Drebus, 431 F.2d 594 (6'h Cir.
1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 948 (1971). There the school had a long-standing rule
against the wearing of buttons, badges, scarves and other means whereby the wearers
identifY themselves as supporters of a cause or bearing messages unrelated to their
education. The court found the button wearing rule appropriate in light of disruptive
conduct possibilities. In Boynton v. Casey, 543 F. Supp. 995 (D. Maine 1982), students
were expelled for the possession of marijuana and the expulsion was upheld by the
court which decided that students had no right to something equivalent to a Miranda
warning. After the Supreme Court's adamant defense of individual liberties in West
Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943), a subsequent
decision, Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97 (1969), found the Court rejecting a
statutory prohibition against teaching Darwinism in schools but then affirming, in the
same opinion, the necessity of comprehensive authority in State and school authorities
to prescribe and control conduct and curriculum in schools. The Court emphatically
upheld the protection of constitutional freedoms in schools in Shelton v. Tucker, 364
U.S. 479 (1960), but then issued a decision eighteen years later in Hazelwood School
District v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260 (1988) (administrative censorship of school
newspaper was permissible), that outraged many in the literary world as a complete
demolition of free expression in public schools. See infra, note 53.
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The fact is, the Supreme Court did not really address student privacy rights in public schools until 1985, after a long
series of contradictory decisions from lower courts. 4 These lower
court decisions will be summarized merely to indicate the various court approaches to the issue of student Fourth Amendment rights. Their lack of cohesion serves best as an indication
of the need for finality from the Supreme Court, which came
with the ruling in New Jersey v. T.L.O., in 1985. 5
A small group of decisions, which will be addressed in
greater length, consists of those select cases in which elemental
issues of constitutional protections were addressed and defined
by the Court in such a way as to provide a basis for the T.L. 0.
decision and its progeny. 6 Unlike the first scattered group, the
decisions from this smaller set were not isolated to the area of
student's rights. They were cases from various gristmills of law
in our society: criminal, civil, residential and industrial. The
decisions in those cases refined search and seizure principles,
forming precedential steps by which the Court would ultimately
bring the Fourth Amendment to the doors of public school.
These cases and the rules flowing from them were employed
to create the "special needs" exception-the latest and most
broad exception to the warrant requirement of the Fourth
Amendment. 7 This line of cases, tracing the development of

4. See infra notes 42 and 43.
5. 469 U.S. 325 (1985).
6. Id. at 325 (1985). Significant decisions applied: Elkins v. United States, 364
U.S. 206 (1960) (applying the Fourth Amendment protections to the States via the
Fourteenth Amendment); West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette, 319
U.S. 624 (1943) (necessity of upholding constitutional protections if we are to teach
youth the validity of the constitution); Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community
School District, 393 U.S. 503 (1969) (defining governmental actions as activities by
State agents and agencies); Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523 (1967)
(balancing test between governmental need and the weight of intrusion); Goss v.
Lopez, 419 U.S. 565 (1975) (hasty and effective action needed to maintain discipline
necessary in school setting); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1967) (even a limited search
of a person is an intrusion); Almeida-Sanchez v. United States, 413 U.S. 266 (1973)
("probable cause is not an 'irreducible' requirement of a valid search").
7. After its introduction into Fourth Amendment jurisprudence, the special
needs exception expanded. Examples of special needs searches today are numerous.
They include searches of prisoners, parolees, and probationers, as well as border
searches, immigration stops and searches, airport security checks, administrative and
regulatory searches, and military searches. The most recent example is found in the
practice of drug testing employees in certain fields. See Skinner v. Railway Labor
Executives' Ass'n., 489 U.S. 602 (1989).
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exceptions to the warrant requirement, is of such independent
significance that it necessitates separate discussion.

B.

DEFINING A GOVERNMENT SEARCH

Considering the list of societal players from parents to nosy
neighbors and their pets, there will likely always be unwanted
searches taking place for which there is no Fourth Amendment
protection. It is not these intrusions which we address or which
the courts consider under the Constitution. The only searches of
constitutional consequence are those executed with the aid,
assistance, or approval of government actors or officials. 8 The
Supreme Court gave some direction on what actors and activities constituted a government action in 1960 with Elkins v.
United States. 9 But it was seven years later in Katz v. United
States that the Court took an opportunity to measure what
government actions were acceptable under the Fourth Amendment.10

1. The Katz Case
In 1967, Charles Katz was convicted in the District Court
for the Southern District of California under an eight-count
indictment charging him with transmitting wagering information by telephone from Los Angeles to Miami and Boston in
violation of a federal statute. 11 At trial the Government was
permitted, over the defendant's objection, to introduce evidence
of his end of the telephone conversations. These conversations
were overheard by FBI agents who had attached an electronic
listening and recording device to the outside of the public telephone booth from which he had placed his calls. In affirming
his conviction, the court of appeals rejected the contention that
the recordings had been obtained in violation of the Fourth

8. See Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 213 (1960).
9. !d.

10. 389 u.s. 347 (1967).
11. 18 U.S.C. §1084 provided in pertinent part: "(a) Whoever being engaged in
the business of betting or wagering knowingly uses a wire communication facility for
the transmission in interstate or foreign commerce of bets or wagers or information
assisting in the placing of bets or wagers on any sporting event or contest, or for the
transmission of a wire communication which entitles the recipient to receive money
or credit as a result of bets or wagers, or for information assisting in the placing of
bets or wagers, shall be fined ... or imprisoned not more than two years, or both."
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Amendment because there was no physical entrance into the
area occupied by the defendant.
The issues presented on appeal to the Supreme Court were:
1) whether a public telephone booth is a constitutionally protected area so that evidence obtained by attaching an electronic
listening device is in violation of the right to privacy of the user
of the booth, and 2) whether physical penetration of a constitutionally protected area is necessary before a search and seizure
can be said to violate the Fourth Amendment. 12
A

Analysis

In the first words of the opinion, the Court quickly ended
the argument over whether a telephone booth was a "constitutionally protected area" by stating that the Fourth Amendment
protects people and their interests, not places. 13 Therefore, the
telephone booth was not at issue. Perhaps more significant, the
Court concluded that what a person knowingly exposes to the
public, even in his own home, would not be the subject of
Fourth Amendment protection. 14 The counter assertion of that
statement is that what a person does not hold out to the public,
regardless ofwhere he keeps it private, carries an interest protected by the Fourth Amendment right to privacy. The Court
dismissed a Government claim that lack of physical trespass
was a threshold requirement of a search or seizure, then moved
to the issue ofwarrants and probable cause for the search. 15
The officers in Katz had exercised great caution and restraint in an effort to insure that the search was not held unreasonable. They had taken care that only Mr. Katz's conversations were recorded or listened to. They had only installed the
bug after having probable cause to believe that betting was
going on. But the Court was not swayed by preventative caution. In spite of the fact that the government had shown that a
magistrate would have granted them a warrant for their search
if they had asked, the Court was not willing to allow the government agents themselves to exercise that class of discretion. 16

12.
13.
14.
15.
16.

See
See
See
See
See

Katz, 389 U.S. at 349-50.
id. at 351.
id.
id. at 354, 355.
id. at 356, 357.
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Ultimately, the Court held that when lacking a prior warrant supported by sworn affidavit proving probable cause, a
search was "per se unreasonable," and the evidence gathered
therefrom could not be used against Mr. Katz. 17 It should be
noted that in so finding, the Court recognized several different
circumstances in which exceptions to the warrant requirement
were already in place. 18 These circumstances included the
search incident to a lawful arrest, 19 the exigency exception of
hot pursuit of a suspect, 20 and a search with a suspect's consent.21
As a result of Katz, the formal test for a legal search rested
on basic text-driven requirements from the plain language of
the Fourth Amendment: 1) was the government involved, 2) did
the suspect subjectively expect privacy, 3) was that expectation
accepted by society as reasonable, and 4) did the officer have a
warrant supported by probable cause and issued by a neutral
magistrate? The significance of these stated criteria in the context of public school search and seizure is that by the time the
Court finally addressed the Fourth Amendment in a public
school setting, these requirements had been substantially removed by a series of cases creating exceptions to the Katz holding.22

C.

THE QUESTION OF GOVERNMENT ACTORS AND ACTIONS

Prior to the Katz decision, the Court had already identified
the first requirement-government action-as any search conducted under the direction or request or permission of the government or its agent. 23 In at least one otherwise unrelated consideration of Fourteenth Amendment requirements in 1943, the

17. !d. at 358, 359.
18. See id. at 357.
19. See Agnello v. United States, 269 U.S. 20 (1925); Carroll v. United States,
267 U.S. 132 (1925).
20. See Warden Md. Penitentiary v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294 (1967); McDonald v.
United States, 335 U.S. 451 (1948).
21. See Zap v. United States, 328 U.S. 624 (1946).
22. See New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 340 (1985) ("Just as we have in
other cases dispensed with the warrant requirement when 'the burden of obtaining
a warrant is likely to frustrate the governmental purpose behind the search,' [Camara
v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 532-33 (1967)], we hold today that school officials
need not obtain a warrant before searching a student who is under their authority").
23. See Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 213 (1960).
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Court had defined government actors or agents to include
school boards and school administrators. 24 Certainly then, in
the context of public school privacy issues, the relationship of
the searcher to the individual or property being searched becomes critical to the analysis. The father searching his child's
bedroom is not a government actor. However, if he happens to
be a school administrator and searches his child's school locker,
under the decisions leading to T.L. 0., he will have triggered
Fourth Amendment scrutiny by his actions.
Part of the principle debate as to administrative duties in
public schools is centered on the principle of in loco parentis
(acting in the parents' place). This idea will be discussed in
greater length under the T.L. 0. decision, however it should be
noted for the sake of perspective, if nothing else, that some of
the pressure applied in T.L. 0. was to persuade the Supreme
Court to view the searches differently in light of the school setting. This pressure came from the idea that a school administrator acts in the place of parents, arguably changing that critical relational element of the search analysis.
D. EXPECTATIONS OF PRIVACY

For the sake of preliminary discussion, school search and
seizure can be assumed to be a state action. The language of the
Fourth Amendment provides an order of elimination by which
the remaining issues are to be addressed. 25 Once having determined, for example, that the search was a state action, the next
issue, again outlined in Katz, becomes whether there was a
subjective expectation of privacy in the item being searched. If
not, the scrutiny ends. If there was such an expectation, a final
test is required: whether that person's expectation is reasonable.
Again, a negative finding ends the scrutiny. A positive response, by strict constitutional definition, makes the search
unreasonable.
The application of this test is clearer in the example of the
father and teenager. In that scenario, the father's search of the
room failed the threshold requirement of Fourth Amendment
analysis in that the was not a state actor or agent in relation to

24. See West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 637 (1943).
25. See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967) (Harlan, J. concurrence).
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the teenager. However, if we were to assume the possibility
that the father was a school administrator and had searched
the teenager's school locker, under the early case which defined
school authorities as State actors, the first criteria is met and
the second and third factors come into play. 26 At home, though
the child might have an expectation of privacy from parents,
society is not willing to recognize that expectation as reasonable.
It is not by coincidence that this issue of "reasonable expectation" becomes a core consideration in any application of
search and seizure law in public schools. Does the student have
a reasonable expectation of privacy in his or her locker? This
kind of question has become integral to court determinations of
the nature of school administrative actions. This type of question is reformed and revised and reapplied for each school and
each student in the United States. Each new iteration changes
the expression and application of search and seizure law in
public schools. If one student cannot reasonably expect privacy
for his public school locker, then can another student expect to
maintain the privacy of her book bag contents? If a book bag,
then what about a purse? If a purse, what about a coat pocket?
If a coat pocket, then what about a pant pocket? If a pant
pocket, then what about underclothing? If underclothing, then
what about body fluids?
Such a direct line drawn from lockers to test tubes accelerates the discussion, but can also be distracting. The issue of
student privacy does not generate answers by a tangential measure of a search's proximity to an individual student's bare
skin. With each case, different circumstances (each paralleling
the Fourth Amendment analysis in importance) must be considered. There is no denying that individual circumstances and
factors tend to muddy constitutional water and make the analysis-not to mention the application-of the Fourth Amendment
much less definitive. For instance, under the Katz test, a locker
search may be appropriate if supported by a warrant based on
probable cause. However, the same search may not have been
appropriate for a row of lockers. Such a search would be too
generalized and risks intrusion upon students outside the circle

26. West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943).
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of suspicion. And yet, as the analysis continues, such a search
(suspicionless) for drugs becomes permissible.
Thus, the Fourth Amendment merely constitutes a point of
entry for search and seizure analysis in public schools, and does
not supply a solid formula for every circumstance. Each case
requires the court (or lesser actors) to determine what constitutes a reasonable expectation under the circumstances. It is
the demonstrated difficulty and inconsistency of that determination that so complicates the definition of privacy in public
schools.
E.

ATTEMPTS TO DEFINE ''REASONABLE" EXPECTATIONS OF
PRIVACY

Due in part to the fact that the wording of the Fourth
Amendment merely includes a prohibition against "unreasonable" searches and seizures by the government, the Supreme
Court has not supplied a clear definition of what constitutes a
reasonable search or seizure. The test for subjective and socially
acceptable privacy expectations places immense discretionary
and interpretive burdens upon the courts. How, for instance, is
a court to know with certainty what society deems a reasonable
expectation? Similarly, how is the court to accurately interpret
each new set of social and personal circumstances attending
each new search? Moreover, the answer might be easier to live
with than its ramifications. The fact that a given search violates a drug dealer's reasonable expectation of privacy will not
assuage the neighborhood fury over a crack house left open for
business. Thus, the definition of what is reasonable grows in
importance as well as perplexity.
In United States v. Montoya de Hernandez, 27 the Court
stated that reasonableness "depends upon all of the circumstances surrounding the search or seizure and the nature of the
search or seizure itself." 28 From this open-ended definition came
the development of the first of several balancing tests regarding
search and seizure. Unable to find a bright line definition for an
enigmatic word like "reasonableness," this balancing test attempts to ferret out the greater good by sorting all the circum-

27. United States v. Montoya de Hernandez, 473 U.S. 531 (1985).
28. 473 U.S. 531, 537 (1985).
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stances surrounding a given search onto the side of either governmental interest or intrusion. 29
In reality, all this dividing and weighing only creates more
questions. After all, the enhanced order of consideration entails
the following: 1) was the search conducted by a government
actor or agent, 2) if so, did the party being searched have a
subjective expectation of privacy in the item searched, 3) if so,
is that expectation one which society is willing to accept as
reasonable, and 4) if so, did the governmental need outweigh
the intrusion upon a citizen's privacy? But how is the court to
decide the gravity of the governmental interest or predict the
ramifications of a single intrusion upon privacy?
The test, like others measuring concepts of social conscience, cries out for a numerical weight or register which offers
some exactness. But numerical formulas are not effectively
applied to issues of human discretion, and a court, having found
no common denominator for individual rights, is perhaps the
least likely institution to attempt such an application. 30 Instead, it generally will choose to err on the side of the individual rights, as it did in the case of privacy, creating a presumption that any intrusion is unreasonable where the government
or its agent has not proven it to be necessary by sworn affidavit.
In light of that presumption, the government actor is required to obtain a valid search warrant by demonstrating probable cause to a neutral magistrate prior to conducting the
search. The purpose of this exercise, as explained by the Supreme Court in Aguilar u. Texas, is to insure that the rights of
the individual are not lost or forgotten in the harried atmosphere of law enforcement. 31

29. See Skinner v. Ry. Labor Executives' Ass'n., 489 U.S. 602, 619 (1989);
Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 654 (1979); United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428
U.S. 543 (1976).
30. The appreciable nature of individual human rights seems such that our
judicial system has never been willing, as a whole, to assign numbers to the
evaluation of constitutional rights, human pain and suffering, life or death. The mere
contemplation devalues intangible interests. Thus, flat numerical systems for
measuring such damages are strongly discouraged. Tort money damage claims
represent the closest relation to such a measurement, but are still a crude mechanism
for compensating victims for damage to something considered inalienable. They are
only "accurate" when based upon some contractual measure such as insurance terms
or anticipated financial costs or losses.
31. 378 u.s. 108 (1964).
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In practical effect, the neutral magistrate becomes a gatekeeper, charged with issuing warrants only where there is
probable cause to believe that the search will reveal evidence of
the commission or contemplation of a crime. Sworn affidavits
showing that probability and an explanation of why a warrant
is necessary to further important police interests, help create a
balancing mechanism to measure the level of intrusion against
the governmental interest. A secondary but wholly appreciable
contribution of this requirement is to minimize for law enforcement personnel the opportunity to abuse discretion imposed
upon them by the Supreme Court's circumstantial definition of
a "reasonable" search. 32
F. EXIGENCY EXCEPTIONS TO THE RULE

The development of a presumption of unreasonableness
without a warrant gave rise to a series of cases and decisions in
which efforts to protect individual rights by correctly balancing
government interests and privacy considerations failed to satisfy the practical needs of administration. 33 In final effect, the
balancing test of a reasonable burden relative to government
interest need only be applied in cases where the warrant and
probable cause requirements have been met, and yet a social ill
persists or perhaps thrives. In those cases (a number of which
were presented to the courts immediately on the heels of Katz),
strict adherence to the Katz holding simply meant that criminal
activity was benefitted more than law enforcement-to a point
that society would not tolerate.
One reality of document-driven law is that a lack of discretion in the field makes for very immobile policing. It is merely a
reiteration of the age-old conflict between the risks of discretion
and the costs of inefficiency. From the criminal perspective, an
immense, text-heavy law in the middle of the road promotes
detours. The law of search and seizure after Katz was more
dependant upon its own wording and predictably less mobile for
lack of discretionary application; it was thus more subject to
avoidance. 34

32. See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 356-57 (1967).
33. See infra notes 38-40.
34. !d.
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Addressing this conflict between constitutional protection
and undesirable results, the courts carved out exceptions to the
Fourth Amendment formula requirements. 35 For example,
warrantless searches were upheld when exigent circumstances
required an immediate search to prevent the destruction or loss
of evidence of a crime. 36 This represented a reversal of fortunes
for some. The individual interests that had been protected by
the warrant and probable cause requirements could now be
presumed socially unacceptable if the privacy was too likely to
serve a criminal purpose. This exigency exception cut off the
analysis at the point of reasonable expectations of privacy. A
suspect who ran from the police was deemed to hold no reasonable expectation of privacy even in his own home. 37 The question was never asked whether or not the search had been supported by a valid warrant.
Technically, the test for a valid search did not change;
rather, the quality of expectation in privacy changed. Again, the
analogy of a parent's search of the teenager's bedroom leaps to
mind, expanded somewhat by exception to a sense of social
governance. In a paternalistic posture, society says to the miscreant child through the court, "I will respect your rights until
you demonstrate to me that you cannot be trusted, then don't
expect to be cut any slack!"
In recent years, warrantless searches have been upheld by
the Supreme Court for officers in hot pursuit of a suspect,:la in
police stop-and-frisk searches and in border searches.:l 9 Still
more exceptions have been carved out under a premise that
failure of an individual to exhibit a certain level of interest in
privacy (as demonstrated by a failure to sufficiently secure or
hide items) displaces the warranty requirement. 40

35. See Myron Schreck, The Fourth Amendment in Public Schools: Issues f'or the
1990s and Beyond, 25 URB. LAW. 117, 118-19 (1993).
36. See Cupp v. Murphy, 412 U.S. 291 (1973).
37. See Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294 (1967).
38. See id. at 298.
39. See United States v. Montoya de Hernandez, 473 U.S. 531 (1985); United
States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543 (1976); United States v. Ortiz, 422 U.S. 891
(1975); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968); Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132
(1925).
40. See Arizona v. Hicks, 480 U.S. 321 (1987); California v. Carney, 471 U.S.
386 (1985); Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170 (1984); United States v. Ross, 456
U.S. 798 (1982); United States v. Mendenhall, 466 U.S. 544 ( 1980); United States v.
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G. ADMINISTRATIVE EXCEPTIONS TO THE RULE

The creation of so many exigency exceptions to the strict
warrant and probable cause requirements of Katz resulted in
an increased use by the courts of the balancing test to determine the reasonableness of searches in troublesome industries
or public services. Recall for a moment the balancing test already discussed in terms of the weight of intrusion upon privacy compared to the governmental need. 41 That balance test
was applied, in part, by defining "reasonable" according to the
presence or lack of a valid warrant. 42 In light of so many exigency exceptions to the warrant requirement, reasonableness
based on the warrant presence or lack thereof was ineffective.
The troublesome cases were becoming less and less exceptional.
Thus, the courts devised a new class of searches, such as administrative searches, which, because of their unique settings,
carried a presumption of reasonableness without warrants. 43

2. The Camara Decision
Soon the old bones of the warrant and probable cause requirements of Katz would be joined by the exigency requirement, dismissed in an increasing number of cases with the
recognition that the administration of specific industries and
activities required constant, close, and sometimes surprising
regulation in order to curb conditions threatening to the
public. 44 Although the Supreme Court bantered ideas about for

Matlock, 415 U.S. 164 (1974); Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443 (1971);
Chime! v. California, 395 U.S. 752 (1969).
41. See Skinner v. Ry Labor Executives' Ass'n., 489 U.S. 602, 619 (1989).
42. See Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25 (1949); United States v. Katz, 389 U.S
347, 357 (1967).
43. See Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 535 (1967) (building
inspection for housing code violations); O'Connor v. Ortega, 480 U.S. 709 (1987)
(government employer's searching employee's desks); Michigan Dep't. of State Police
v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444 (1990) (sobriety checkpoints upheld).
44. In Frank v. Maryland, 359 U.S. 360 (1959), the Supreme Court first
addressed the constitutionality of administrative searches and found that warrantless
administrative searches could be legal. Though the decision was overruled in less
than a decade by Camara v. Municipal Court of San Francisco, 387 U.S. 523 (1967),
and See u. City of Seattle, 387 U.S. 541 (1967), the factors presented by the Court as
grounds for dismissing a warrant requirement would lay the groundwork for future
court dismissal of a warrant requirement in "special needs" situations. Those theories
were that the inspection touched at most upon the periphery of the important
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3. Analysis
The Supreme Court's decision, while riddled with solid references to Fourth Amendment requirements, presented a mixed
message. On one hand, the Court said that inspections for the
general public health or welfare for fire code violations required
a kind of warrant that did not require probable cause to believe
that a specific person or residence was in violation of the law. 48
On the other hand, the Court insisted that a warrant must be
issued in order to define the scope and authority of the inspection.49 The Court then hinted that the warrant could be deemed
"reasonable" if the legislature statutorily defined the criteria
and the scope in light of a known public concern. 50 Rather than
saying that a warrant is always required, the Court admited
that one is not. Rather than insist that probable cause is always
required, the Court stated that circumstances meeting a statutory permission of inspection would satisfy the probable cause
requirement.
Perhaps most significant for the development of further
exceptions that followed the Camara decision, the Court had
stated that exceptions for certain industries and activities do
exist, and that the elements of a warrant and probable cause
can be more or less critical depending upon the situation. 51
Furthermore, the Court set out a reasonableness standard for
administrative searches that balanced valid public interests
against private intrusions.
In the process of rejecting Frank, the Camara Court admitted the fact that the traditional probable cause requirement
was ill-fitted to the unique circumstances of typical administrative search situations. The Court set out a revised reasonableness standard for these searches that balanced public interests
against the intrusion upon private interests. Administrative
searches without warrants were justified without a complete
showing of probable cause, based on consideration of the following factors: 1) the long history of judicial and public acceptance
of administrative need in the area, 2) the public interest demanding that all dangerous conditions be prevented or abated,

48.
49.
50.
51.

See Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. at 523 (1967).
See id. at 532-33.
See id. at 538.
!d. at 539.
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and 3) the fact that the invasions only involved a limited invasion of privacy. 52 This new set of considerations became increasingly significant as the Court approached search and seizure in
public schools.
With new-found regulatory freedom, administrative
searches grew in number and type relatively quickly, forming a
recognizable appendage to the body of search and seizure law.
In the same year, 1967, the Supreme Court applied the Camara
considerations to justify inspections of buildings not used as
residences. 53 Then, in addition to building inspections, the
courts across the country would follow the Supreme Court's
lead and uphold regulatory searches in closely regulated businesses such as pharmaceutical, 54 firearm, 55 nuclear 56 and mining industries. 5 7
III. BRINGING THE FOURTH AMENDMENT TO SCHOOL
Having traced the evolution of Fourth Amendment analysis
from the hard rules of the Katz decision to the expanding
classes of exception, we turn now to the line of cases upon
which the points of the majority argument in New Jersey v.
T.L.O. were based. 58 While the Fourth Amendment cases moved
toward a recognition of unique standards for reasonableness to
meet unique circumstances, this next line of cases led the Court
to a particular setting that demanded another kind of exception. At most, the convergence of the two lines of cases may
have been unavoidable. At a minimum, it was fortunate timing.
When the Supreme Court addressed the issue of privacy for
students in public school, a line of cases was waiting in the
wings that said the Court could make exceptions to the warrant
and probable cause interpretation of the Fourth Amendment.
Seen from the other side, with the increasing recognition of

52. In the end, the Court admitted that no "ready test for determining
reasonableness other than by balancing the need to search against the invasion which
the search entails" could adequately resolve the question of administrative searches.
Id. at 536-37.
53. See See v. City of Seattle, 387 U.S. 541 (1967).
54. See United States v. Pendergast, 436 F. Supp. 931 (W.D. Pa. 1977).
55. See United States v. Biswell, 406 U.S. 311 (1972).
56. See Rushton v. Nebraska Pub. Power Dist., 844 F.2d 562 (8 1h Cir. 1988).
57. See Donovan v. Dewey, 452 U.S. 594 (1981).
58. 469 U.S. 325 (1985).
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public interests which cried out for a broader exception to the
Katz rules, the issue of public school privacy came forward to
create an extremely sympathetic stage for just such an extensiOn.
A. DEFINING A GOVERNMENT ACTOR

The underlying assumption in the T.L.O. argument was
that an unreasonable search was prohibited by the Fourth
Amendment, as imposed upon the State and its actors by the
Fourteenth Amendment. 59 This application was first made by
the Court in Wolf v. Colorado 60 in 1949 and then reaffirmed in
Elkins v. United States in 1960. 61 More significantly in the majority's argument, after Elkins and Wolf became the law on
government intrusions upon privacy, the Court noted that the
definition of government action had already been expanded to
include public school administration in West Virginia State Bd.
of Ed. v. Barnette. 62 Thus it is with Barnette that the discussion
of who constitutes a government actor begins.

4. The Barnette Case
An early decision by the Supreme Court in 1940, Minersville
School District v. Gobitis, assumed a general power in the
States to impose certain cultural routines and requirements
(such as the flag salute discipline) upon their citizens. 63 Accordingly, the West Virginia Legislature amended its statutes to
require all schools therein to conduct courses of instruction in
history, civics, and the constitutions of the United States and
the State of West Virginia. This was for the stated purpose of
teaching, fostering and perpetuating the ideals, principles and
spirit of Americanism, among other things.
In 1942, following that legislation, the West Virginia State
Board of Education adopted a resolution heavily dependant
upon language from the Gobitis decision and ordered "that the
salute to the flag become a 'regular part of the daily program

59.
60.
61.
62.
63.

See Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 213 (1960).
338 u.s. 25 (1949).
364 U.S. 206 (1960).
319 u.s. 624, 637 (1943).
310 U.S. 586 (1940).

B.Y.U. EDUCATION AND LAW JOURNAL

90

[1999

and activities in public schools.' "64 After some debate within the
school communities, the salute required was a straight-armed
salute with the child keeping the right hand forward and
raised, the palm turned upward, and repeating the Pledge of
Allegiance. 65
Failure to conform to the routine was considered "insubordination" and was dealt with by expulsion from school. Readmission was denied until the student complied. In the meantime,
until the child complied, he or she was considered "unlawfully
absent," an extended duration ofwhich would allow the state to
pursue the parents with a misdemeanor charge, a fine and possible jail term. 66 Some students, primarily those of the Jehovah's Witness faith, refused to comply with the routine as a
matter of religious belief, and were expelled and threatened
with transfer to juvenile detention facilities.

5. Analysis
In Barnette, the Supreme Court reconsidered Gobitis in
order to decide the extent of religious protection applicable to
students as imposed upon the States by the Fourteenth Amendment.67 In so doing, the Court reached the following conclusion,
which was instrumental to later holdings regarding public
schools:
The Fourteenth Amendment, as now applied to the States,
protects the citizen against the State itself and all of its creatures-Boards of Education not excepted. These have, of
course, important, delicate, and highly discretionary function,
but none that they may not perform within the limits of the
Bill of Rights. That they are educating the young for citizenship is reason for scrupulous protection of Constitutional
freedoms of the individual, if we are not to strangle the free
mind at its source and teach youth to discount important
principles of our government as mere platitudes. 68

64.
65.
66.
67.
68.

Barnette, 319 U.S. at 624-25.
See id. at 627.
See id. at 625.
See id. at 627.
ld. at 637.
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While the overt intent of the decision focused on religious
freedom under the First Amendment, a significant result was
the threshold recognition in T.L.O. of the critical balance that
must be struck between the essential social responsibilities and
the liabilities of public school administration. 69 The recognition
of this responsibility was then coupled with an argument that
Fourth Amendment prohibitions formerly applied exclusively to
police searches should logically be extended to all exercise of
sovereign authority by virtue of the Court's holding in Camara
v. Municipal Court in 1967. 70 It is this assumption of duty and
authority that forms a base for actions of search and seizure in
public schools.

B. UNDERSTANDING PUBLIC SCHOOL
As the case law indicates, it is safe to state that search and
seizure, as a cohesive legal concept, did not exist in public
schools before the early 1960s and perhaps not to any great
extent until T.L.O. in 1985. 71 Admittedly, this generalization
hinges upon a broad view of the history of public school and a
view of a prior day when corporeal punishment and regulation
did not yield to students claiming rights to privacy.
While there was a small group of public education cases
filed and fought prior to 1960, they dealt for the most part with
quality of education, parents' rights of decision, and the compulsory nature of the rapidly expanding public school system. 72
Judicial appeals in the interest of students' rights under the
constitution were noticeably absent prior to the 1960s.
It is fair to assume, then, in regard to disciplinary actions in
public schools over those early decades, that without the specter of litigation that drives so much of administrative policy
today, something like the forced emptying of pockets during a
bubble gum inspection from the 1950s could not be considered
under the same hot light of constitutional ramification that

69. New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 334 (1985).
70. 387 U.S. 523 (1967).
71. 469 u.s. 325 (1985).
72. Examples of early education cases are Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390
(1923), wherein the parental right to instruct a child in German in a private school
was upheld, and Pierce v. Society of Sisters of the Holy Names of Jesus and Mary,
268 U.S. 510 (1925), in which the parental right to educate a child as one chooses
was grounded in First and Fourteenth Amendment protection.
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would later illuminate a search of purse or pocket in a drugrelated search in 1985. Of course there were the occasional
class-room shake downs of a suspected cheat, and the memorable grimace of a matronly grammar teacher in sharp spectacles.
There were storied interrogation scenes in the vice principal's
office (blinds drawn) and then detention hall after school. The
essential differences between those actions then and now are
found in the line of cases which defines the roles and responsibilities of public school administrators.
C. AN INCREASING RECOGNITION OF FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT
RIGHTS

Until the late 1940s, none of the Fourteenth Amendment
due process provisions were applied to the States by the Supreme Court. 73 In fact, only the Fourth Amendment prohibition
against unreasonable searches and seizures and the Sixth
Amendment right to a public trial were addressed before
1961. 74 Eventually, the protections of the Fourth, Fifth, Sixth,
and Eighth Amendments were held to be binding upon State
legislatures and State courts, but it would still take decades of
social change and several landmark cases involving students in
public schools to bring a student with a Fourth Amendment
claim to the Supreme Court. 75

73. The Fourth Amendment prohibition against unreasonable searches and
seizures, Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25 (1949), and the exclusionary rule requiring
that the result of a violation of this prohibition not be used as evidence against the
defendant, See Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961). The Fifth Amendment privilege
against compulsory self-incrimination, Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964). The Fifth
Amendment prohibition against double jeopardy, Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784
(1969). The Sixth Amendment right to a speedy trial, Klopfer v. North Carolina, 386
U.S. 213 (1967). The Sixth Amendment right to a public trial, In re Oliver, 333 U.S.
257 (1948). The Sixth Amendment right to a trial by jury, Duncan v. Louisiana, 391
U.S. 145 (1968). The Sixth Amendment Right to confront witnesses, Pointer v. Texas,
380 U.S. 400 (1965). The Sixth Amendment right to compulsory process for obtaining
witnesses, Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14 (1967). The Sixth Amendment right to
assistance of counsel in felony cases, Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963), and
in misdemeanor cases in which imprisonment is imposed, Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407
U.S. 25 (1972). The Eighth Amendment prohibition against cruel and unusual
punishment, Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660 (1962).
74. See In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257 (1948); Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25 (1949J.
75. See New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325 (1985). A fourteen-year-old high
school freshman was accused of smoking in the girls lavatory. When she denied it,
cigarettes were found in her purse. The search Jed to suspicion of drug use, and when
continued, revealed marijuana. While there is no question that some students smoked
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The Fourth Amendment history, leading to the development
of administrative searches, exigency exceptions, etc. is vital to
an understanding of New Jersey v. T.L.O. 76 in 1985. However,
contemporary to the line of cases leading to administrative
searches and then to the "special needs exception," 77 there was
a group of cases dealing with constitutional protections in
schools, which also influenced the Supreme Court's decision in
T.L. 0. 78 This parallel line of cases includes early decisions such
as Meyer v. Nebraska. 79 There, the Supreme Court held that
State laws could not be passed under the Fourteenth Amendment protections which interfere with the rights of parents to
have their children learn a foreign language.
Scattered Decisions

Not all of the decisions concerning students were as favorable as Meyer or Barnette, which followed later. Nor did they
follow a predictable path toward greater constitutional protection for students. State and federal courts considering the question of Fourth Amendment protections in schools struggled to

in school bathrooms, even in the1940s and 1950s, T.L.O. was the first case in which
the accompanying search for cigarettes was contested to the Supreme Court. The
presence of marijuana, and the attendant charges were undoubtedly critical factors
in the contest.
76. !d.
77. "Special needs exception" was created in New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325
(1985). Recognizing the exceptional circumstances, beyond normal need for law
enforcement, and making the warrant and probable cause requirements impracticable,
the Court ultimately held that public school officials do not need to obtain a warrant
in order to search students.
78. Justice White drafted the opinion, with Justices O'Connor, Blackman, and
Powell concurring; with partial concurrence and partial dissent by Justices Brennan
and Marshall. The significant cases of support were, in order of reference. Elkins v.
United States, 364 U.S. 206 (1960) (applying the Fourth Amendment protections to
the States via the Fourteenth Amendment), West Virginia State Bd. of Ed. v.
Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943) (necessity of upholding constitutional protections if we
are to teach youth the validity of the Constitution), Tinker v. Des Moines
Independent Community School District, 393 U.S. 503 (1969) (defining governmental
actions as activities by State agents and agencies), Camara v. Municipal Court, 387
U.S. 523 (1967) (balancing test between governmental need and the weight of
intrusion), Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565 (1975) (hasty and effective action needed to
maintain discipline necessary in school setting), Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1967)
(even a limited search of a person is an intrusion), Almeida-Sanchez v. United States,
413 U.S. 266 (1973) (probable cause is not an "irreducible" requirement of a valid
search).
79. 262 U.S. 390 (1923).
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accommodate the interests protected by the Fourth Amendment
and the interest of the States in providing a safe environment
for the educational purposes of public schools. Some courts
resolved the tension between these interests by weighing one
greater than the other. In a number of cases, courts held that
school officials conducting in-school searches of students were
private parties acting in loco parentis and were, therefore, not
subject to the constraints of the Fourth Amendment. 80
Other courts held or suggested that the probable cause standard was applicable at least where the police were involved in
the search or where it was highly intrusive. 81 Many other courts
seemed to reach a middle ground, where the Fourth Amendment was applied to searches conducted by school authorities,
but the special needs of the school environment required assessment of the legality of those searches against a standard
less exacting than the normal probable cause standard. Those
courts, for the most part, upheld warrantless searches, provided they were supported by a reasonable suspicion that the
search would uncover evidence of an infraction of school disciplinary rules. 82
The decisions formed a broad range of outcomes. Although
one could predict an eventual Supreme Court confrontation
with student privacy, 83 it would be difficult to guess which way
the legal wind would be blowing when it finally happened. The
early development of search and seizure law in the public
school resembled the clumsy, head-long surge of the adolescence upon which it so often intruded. There were bold bursts
and then misgivings in later decisions-admitting the unique-

80. See D.R.C. v. State, 646 P.2d 252 (Alaska Ct. App. 1982); In re Thomas G.,
90 Cal. Rptr. 361 (1970); In re Donaldson, 75 Cal. Rptr. 220 (1969); R.C.M. v. State,
660 S.W.2d 552 (Tex. App. 1983); Mercer v. State, 450 S.W.2d 715 (Tex. Civ. App.
1970).
81. M. v. Board of Ed. Ball-Chatham Community Unit Sch. Dist. No. 5, 429 F.
Supp. 288, (SD Ill. 1977); Picha v. Wielgos, 410 F. Supp. 1214, (N.D. Ill. 1976); State
v. Young, 216 S.E.2d 586, (1975); M.M. v. Anker, 607 F.2d 588 (1979).
82. See Tarter v. Raybuck, 742 F.2d 977 (CA6 1984); Bilbrey v. Brown, 738 F.2d
1462 (CA9 1984); Horton v. Goose Creek Indep. Sch. Dist., 690 F.2d 470 (CA5 1982);
Bellnier v. Lund, 438 F. Supp. 47 (N.D.N.Y. 1977); In re W., 105 Cal. Rptr. 775
(1973); State v. Baccino, 282 A.2d 869 (Del. Super. 1971); State v. D.T.W., 425 So.2d
1383 (Fla. App. 1983); People v. Ward, 233 N.W.2d 180 (1975); Doe v. State, 540 P.2d
827 (N.M. App. 1975); State v. McKinnon, 558 P.2d 781 (1977); In re L.L., 280
N.W.2d 343 (Wis. App. 1979).
83. New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325 (1985).
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ness of the public school circumstance. 84 Supreme Court decisions seemed constantly pushed and then reigned in by an everchanging social sense of occasion. 85

D. CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS IN STUDENTS
It is one thing to state that students, being citizens of the
United States, are entitled to protections under the Constitution, and even that point has been debated. 86 It has proven a
completely different battle to define the scope of those rights.
One of the early decisions addressing what rights a student has
was Tinker u. Des Moines Independent Community School District in 1969. 87

6. The Tinker Decision
On a December evening in the mid-western winter of 1965,
at least five Des Moines public school students, including John
Tinker, fifteen, Christopher Eckhardt, sixteen, and John's little
sister, Mary Beth Tinker, thirteen, (enrolled in junior high)
attended a meeting in the Eckhardt home, in which passionate
views about hostilities in Vietnam were vented and discussed
between the adults and youth present. As the meeting concluded, the participants determined to make a public showing
of their support for a truce in Vietnam by wearing black armbands throughout the holiday season. With increased zeal they
resolved to fast on December 16 and New Year's Eve.
In the days following the meeting, some principals from Des
Moines area schools got wind of the planned activity. On December 14th, they met, drafted and adopted a policy to deal with
the demonstrators. Any student wearing an armband to school

84. See Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260 (1988), and the cases
leading to it; Nicholson v. Bd. of Educ., Torrance Unified Sch. Dist., 682 F.2d 858 (9'h
Cir. 1982); Seyfried v. Walton, 668 F.2d 214 (3ru Cir. 1982); Trachtman v. Anker, 563
F.2d 512 (2"<1 Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 925 (1978).
85. See Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260 (1988). The Supreme
Court almost completely reverses prior arguments in Tinker which promised liberal
protection to students under the Fourteenth Amendment. Citing the sensitivity of
school children and the unique responsibility of the school administrator, many were
shocked by the "step backward" toward censorship in Hazelwood. See, e.g., Richard
L. Roe, Valuing Student Speech: The Work of the Schools as Conceptual Development,
79 CAL. L. REV. 1269 (October 1991).
86. See West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 637 (1943).
87. 393 u.s. 503 (1969).
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would be asked to remove it. If the student failed to comply, he
or she would be suspended until they returned without the arm
band.
Fully aware of this new policy, on December 16, Mary Beth
Tinker and Christopher Eckhardt wore black armbands to their
schools. John Tinker wore his armband the next day, as did two
other students who did not become parties to the Tinker suit.
All refused to remove the armbands when asked, and all were
suspended as a result. None of the three named students returned to school until after the appointed end of the protest,
New Year's Eve. Shortly thereafter, a suit was filed against the
Des Moines Independent School District on behalf of the students by their fathers, claiming a violation of the students'
First Amendment Rights, specifically the right to free speech.
It is worth noting that by 1969, a century of civil exertion
had served to raise the public perception of individual liberties
to the point that even demonstrating students who would have
been whipped, expelled, and even publicly humiliated in the
early days of public education could now be granted Supreme
Court protection. 88
7. Analysis

In its decision, the Supreme Court held that students do not
shed their constitutional rights to freedom of speech or expression at the schoolhouse gate. 89 In support of that statement, the
Court relied on Barnette citation noted above. 90 But almost
immediately after that statement of freedom, the Court cited
earlier decisions in which it recognized school officials' need to
maintain order and control conduct. 91 The Court recognized the
critical balance it was being asked to find between a student's
right to exercise a constitutional right and the school's interest
in maintaining order and discipline. 92
The Court next initiated a test which would come into play
in later decisions regarding school administrative actions-the
reasonableness of an action. In order for a given action by

88.
89.
90.
91.
92.

See
See
See
See
See

id. at 506.
Tinker, 393 U.S. at 505.
supra, note 68.
Tinker, 393 U.S. at 505.
id. at 505-6.
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school administration to be found reasonable, there must be
proof that the action was caused by some actual threat of material and substantial interference with school functions and purpose.93 A mere desire to avoid discomfort or an "undifferentiated
fear" of disturbance would not qualify under the Court's test. 94
The Court went on to say,
School officials do not possess absolute authority over their
students. Students in school as well as out of school are "persons" under our Constitution. They are possessed of fundamental rights which the State must respect, just as they
themselves must respect their obligations to the State. 95

This declaration of students' rights would influence Supreme
Court decisions in the years following Tinker, to the extent of
becoming something of a presumption. By 1985, no argument
from either side of the decision in T.L.O. felt it necessary to
debate the question of whether students deserved constitutional protection. 96

8. The Goss Decision
Equally influential, however, was the holding in a 1975
Supreme Court decision, Goss v. Lopez. 97 Goss involved a conflict between an Ohio state law providing for free education for
all children between the ages of six and twenty-one and a school
administrator's ability to expel students for breaches of school
rules.
A group of nine students, (all minorities) from a public high
school in Columbus, Ohio were suspended for their involvement
in wide-spread student unrest in the school district during February and March of 1971. State law required that the students
be given a hearing on their suspension within ten days, but
none of the nine students were given such a hearing. When the
state court ordered that the students be reinstated and that

93.
94.
95.
96.
97.

See id. at 507.
See id.
Id. at 511.
New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325 (1985).
419 U.S. 565 (1975).
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their records be expunged of any reference to the suspension,
the State appealed. 98
9. Analysis
Although the question presented to the Supreme Court was
one of due process, the Court also made a clear statement as to
the very real need in public school administration for freedom
to act quickly in disciplinary actions. That recognized need
would become instrumental in the T.L.O. decision as the majority gathered support for an argument that a strict search and
seizure requirement of a warrant supported by affidavits was
just not practicable in a public school setting. 99 Ultimately, the
Court held that a warrant was not required of school officials
for a search of a student. 100
With support from its decision in Goss for the proposition
that a warrant requirement was "unsuited to the school environment,"101 all that remained was to address the issue of probable
cause. On this point the Court turned to another prior decision
in the Almeida-Sanchez case wherein it had held that the probable cause requirement was not always necessary to a reasonable search. 102
The exact language from the Almeida-Sanchez decision was,
"both the concept of probable cause and the requirement of a
warrant bear on the reasonableness of a search," and, "in certain limited circumstances neither is required." 103
As has been stated, New Jersey v. T.£.0. 104 was not only the
culminating point for two distinct groups of cases, but it represented the Supreme Court's first encounter with the issue of
Fourth Amendment protection for students in public schools. In
its holding, the Court created the latest and perhaps the broadest exception to the Katz warrant and probable cause requirements-what has come to be known as the "special needs" exception.

98.
99.
100.
101.
102.
103.
104.

See Goss, 419 U.S. at 568.
See id. at 580.
See T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 340.
!d.
Almeida-Sanchez v. United States, 413 U.S. 266 (1973).
!d. at 277.
469 U.S. at 325 (1985).
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E. NEW JERSEY V. T.L. 0.
In March of 1980, a teacher at Piscataway High School in
New Jersey discovered two girls smoking in the lavatory. One
of the two girls was the defendant, T.L.O., who was only fourteen at the time and a freshman at the school. Because smoking
in the lavatory was a violation of school rules, the teacher took
the girls to the Principal's Office where they met the Assistant
Vice Principal Choplick. 105
In response to Mr. Choplick's questions, T.L.O.'s companion
admitted that she had violated the rule. When asked, however,
T.L.O. denied that she had been smoking in the lavatory and
said that she didn't smoke at all. Mr. Choplick asked T.L.O. to
come into his office where he demanded to see her purse. Opening the purse, he found a pack of cigarettes, which he removed
and presented to T.L.O., accusing her oflying to him. 106
In reaching for the cigarettes, Mr. Choplick had seen, in the
purse, a packet of rolling papers for cigarettes. From his experience, possession of rolling papers by high school students meant
involvement with marijuana. Suspecting that he would find
more evidence of drug use in the purse, Mr. Choplick looked
closely in the purse and found a small amount of marijuana, a
pipe, some empty plastic bags, and an unusually large roll of
one-dollar bills. Also in the purse was an index card that appeared to be a list of student customers who owed T.L.O. money
and two letters which implicated T.L.O. in dealing marijuana.
After Mr. Choplick notified police and T.L.O.'s mother,
T.L.O. went with her mother to police headquarters and confessed to selling marijuana in the high school. On the basis of
that confession and the evidence found by Mr. Choplick, delinquency charges were filed against T.L.O. In court, T.L.O. contended that her confession and the evidence found by Mr.
Choplick were tainted by his illegal search of her purse. The
court denied her motion to suppress the evidence and she was
held to be a delinquent and put on probation for one year. On
appeal to State Supreme Court held the search was in violation

105. See id. at 328.
106. See id.
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of constitutional rights under U.S. Supreme Court decisions,
and the evidence was ruled inadmissible. 107

10.

Student Expectations of Privacy

The Court first held, on the basis of Elkins 108 and
Barnette, 109 that the Fourth Amendment's prohibition of unreasonable searches and seizures applies to searches conducted by
public school officials. Next, the argument turned to the student's expectation of privacy. Though never citing directly to
the Tinker 110 decision, the Court nevertheless relied heavily on
the Tinker reasoning that because students don't give up their
constitutional rights when they enter the school, they should
not be reasoned to have waived privacy rights as to the contents
of their bags, pockets, and purses either. 111
11.

Special Needs of the School Environment

Having established students' rights and reasonable expectations of privacy, the Court next faced the task of explaining why
those two considerations were not enough to find the search
unreasonable and suppress the evidence. This is that critical
juncture at which the line of cases showing the evolution of
exceptions to the Katz warrant and probable cause requirements comes to bare. Thus far, the case law presented has been
for the purpose of showing that students have rights and that
the administrators are state actors and are bound by the
Fourth Amendment.
Having already shown in a plethora of search and seizure
cases that exceptional circumstances required exceptions to the
hard and fast requirements of traditional Fourth Amendment
analysis, the first point of attack for the Supreme Court with

107. See id. at 329-30.
108. Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 213 (1960l ("the Federal Constitution,
by virtue of the Fourteenth Amendment, prohibits unreasonable searches and seizures
by state officers").
109. West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 637 (1943) ("The
Fourteenth Amendment, as now applied to the States, protects the citizen against the
State itself and all of its creatures-Board of Education not excepted").
110. Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Community Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 506 (1969)
("It can hardly be argued that either students or teachers shed their constitutional
rights to freedom of speech or expression at the schoolhouse gate").
111. See T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 339.
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regard to the reasonableness of a school search was to show the
unique disciplinary needs in the public school environment.
Citing the results of a congressional study on school safety 112
and its own statement from Goss 113 in 1975, the Court argued
that school safety and discipline required some "easing of the
restrictions to which searches by public authorities are ordinarily subject." 114 The opinion continued, "[t]he warrant requirement ... is unsuited to the school environment ... [and]
would unduly interfere with the maintenance of the swift and
informal disciplinary procedure needed in the schools." 115
12.

The Warrant and Probable Cause Requirements

Next, the majority addressed the probable cause requirement. Since some of the Court's earlier holdings on exigency
exceptions had stated that either a warrant or probable cause
could be set aside under specific circumstances and still not
make a search inherently unreasonable, both could be set aside,
if need be, and other checks on officer's discretion would
suffice. 116
The Court's answer was to create a test to fit differing circumstances, setting aside the requirement for a warrant or
probable cause. That test asks: 1) whether the action was justified at its inception, and 2) whether the search as conducted
was reasonably related in scope to the circumstances which
justified the interference in the first place. 117 As a guide, the
Court indicated that a search of a student by a school official
would normally be justified in its inception "when there are
reasonable grounds for suspecting that the search will turn up
evidence that the student has violated or is violating either the
law or the rules of the school." 118

112. See id.; U.S. Dept. of Health, Education, and Welfare, Violent Schools-Safe
Schools: The Safe School Study Report to the Congress, 1 NIE (1978) ("[I]n recent
years, school disorder has often taken particularly ugly forms: drug use and violent
crime in the schools have become major social problems").
113. Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 580 (1975) ("[e)vents calling for discipline are
frequent occurrences and sometimes require immediate, effective action").
114. T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 340.
115. !d.
116. See id. at 340-41.
117. See id.
118. !d. at 341-42.
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In Loco Parentis

It should also be noted that the Court was troubled by the
State assertion that school administrators were acting in loco
parentis, or in the role of parents, and thus should not be forced
to justify their actions in the T.L. 0. search under Fourth
Amendment analysis. 119 The Court noted that it had recognized
that theory of delegation in the past, but insisted that it did not
intend to remove from school administrators any liability for
their actions as representatives of the State. 120 Thus, in the
end, the Court found the possibility of liability based on the
dual role of school administrators. The laxness of the test created in T.L.O. for a reasonable search under the special needs
exception seemed to account for some appreciation of the theory
of in loco parentis. No longer would an administrator be required to obtain a warrant or show probable cause. Instead,
immediate action in response to a perceived problem with the
person's charge was justified for many of the same reasons we
use to excuse the father's search of his son's room.
The special needs exception was the latest and broadest
exception permitting a court to engage in a balancing test
rather than adhere to the Fourth Amendment's textual requirements where the government can articulate a special need to do
so. In this key decision, the Supreme Court not only demonstrated the evolution of its concept of constitutional requirements in a search, but created a type of search that perhaps no
one could have predicted twenty years earlier. From its former
insistence that a warrant and probable cause be present, the
Court had moved to the other extreme, saying that in some
situations neither a warrant or probable cause was essential to
a reasonable search. 121
This result may be framed as a statement of changing
times. Such an explanation is acceptable to a limited extent. As
a whole, we get accustomed to change, and we adjust to it. But
a more complete and satisfying explanation is found in the
cases the majority cited and the precedents they followed. Thus,
the structure of this discussion has centered on those pieces.

119. !d. at 336.
120. See id.
121. See id. at 340-41.
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Thus far, the Court's discussion has been devoted to perhaps
the most telling factor-the unique circumstances that were
addressed by the Court.
T.L.O. was groundbreaking in the obvious particulars already discussed: the creation of a new exception to traditional
search and seizure law, and the dismissal ofwarrant and probable cause requirements. But the long-term significance of
T.L.O. might be measured from more subtle points in the decision. For instance, the test proposed by the Court for determining the reasonableness of a search did not specifically require
individualized suspicion. 122 Nor did it insist on any proof that
information leading to the search be validated or tested in any
way. Actions by administration were accepted as valid in T.L. 0.
if the actions could be shown to be reasonable under the circumstances.
Under the new criteria, a mistaken observation or a faulty
report could still be reasonable grounds to conduct a search if
the circumstances were convincing. Without the requirement of
either probable cause and with only a reference to "reasonable
scope" to substitute for individualized suspicion, broad and
random searches could be upheld based on little more than a
perception of a serious but general problem which might be

122. See id. at 340-41. The Court stated:
The school setting also requires some modification of the level of suspicion
of illicit activity needed to justify a search .... The accommodation of the
privacy interests of school children with the substantial need of teachers
and administrators for freedom to maintain order in schools does not
require strict adherence to the requirement that searches be based on
probable cause.
Nowhere in the T.L.O. decision is there a requirement made of individualized
suspicion. As the quotes above indicate, there was every inference that lack of
individualized suspicion, like the lack of probable cause, could be excused on the basis
of circumstances. In Vernonia v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 653 (1995), the Court said of
their decision in T.L.O., "The school search we approved in T.L.O., while not based
on probable cause, was based on individualized suspicion of wrongdoing. As we
explicitly acknowledged, however, 'the Fourth Amendment imposes no irreducible
requirement of such suspicion.'" (emphasis added).
The preceding italicized quote which Justice Ginsburg attributed to the
principle of individualized suspicion, was directed to the requirement of probable
cause, as shown earlier in this footnote. It is difficult to ascertain why the principle
of individualized suspicion was brought up at all when it was dismissed just as
quickly however, the fact remains the T.L.O. search may have been based on
individualized suspicion, but the T.L.O. approved exception to traditional Fourth
Amendment analysis did not have any such requirement.
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effectively regulated by general searches. Using this T.L.O.
test, schools attempted bold inroads upon the Fourth Amendment, some of which failed. 123
14.

The Cales Failure, The Williams Success

In 1980, Ruth Cales, fifteen, was a student at Howell High
School. The school operated on staggered sessions. She was
assigned to the afternoon session on the day of April 30, 1980.
That afternoon, when she was supposed to be in class, school
security (another innovation in recent years) observed her in
the parking lot of the school, attempting to avoid detection by
hiding behind a parked car.
When the security guard confronted her and asked for her
name, she lied about her identity-though the record does not
indicate how the officer new she was lying. Subsequently, she
was escorted to the office of Assistant Principal McCarthy. Mr.
McCarthy presided over the remainder of the search process by
giving instructions to a Ms. Steinhelper who searched Ruth in a
separate office. First Ruth was ordered to dump the contents of
her purse on a desk. This was done in front of Mr. McCarthy.
Several "readmittance slips" were revealed, which were improperly in her possession. Based on his observation of the slips, Mr.
McCarthy would later testify that he suspected Ruth's involvement in drug activity.
Mr. McCarthy then ordered Ruth to turn her pants pockets
inside-out, which revealed nothing unusual. Then, in another
office without Mr. McCarthy, Ruth was ordered to remove her
pants in front of Ms. Steinhelper. When this revealed nothing
incriminating, Mr. McCarthy ordered Ruth, via Ms.
Steinhelper, to bend over in such a way that Ms. Steinhelper
could inspect the contents of her brassiere. Again, nothing unusual was found.
The lawsuit against the Howell school district which followed was addressed by the District Court as a matter of an
unreasonable, and thus, unjustifiable search under the recent
ruling in T.£.0. 124 The court used the T.L.O. ruling as the standard by which they determined that the search of Ruth Cales

123. See Cales v. Howell Public Schools, 635 F. Supp. 454 (E.D. Mich. 1985).
124. See id. at 456.
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had been unreasonable. The court found that the high school
had no written policy on strip searches of students. It also held
that because the test was unreasonable in its inception, the
second prong of the test, the issue of scope, was never considered.
The court refused to accept as reasonable the perception by
Mr. McCarthy that Ruth's "ducking behind a car in the Howell
High School parking lot" and possession of "readmittance slips"
constituted circumstances that made any search for drug possession reasonable. It indicated that a search of the contents of
the purse would likely be justified, on the basis of her lie to the
security officer as to her identity. A need to prove her identity
and prove that she was not involved in theft or other illegality
in the parking lot seemed reason enough. However, as soon as
the search was deemed unreasonable, liability was imposed,
and the analysis did not continue to the subject of whether or
not Ruth should have been made to strip. 125
On the other end of the spectrum lies the Williams by Williams v. Ellington decision, in which a strip search of a high
school student was found permissible by the Sixth Circuit
Court. 126 In that case, school administrators acted on the basis
of repeated tips from a fellow student that two girls were doing
drugs. On January 22, 1988, a final tip was given by the informing student, stating that the two suspected girls were "at it
again." 127
Based on the cumulative information from this student as
well as some unsolicited finger pointing by the suspected students, the teacher contacted and fully updated a vice principal.
A search of the girls' lockers and purses revealed a small vial
containing an over-the-counter substance nicknamed "rush."
She was then taken into an office where she was instructed by
a female faculty member to empty her pockets, then remove her
shirt and then drop her pants. The further search revealed
nothing suspicious.
In reviewing the reasonableness and scope of that search,
the Sixth Circuit Court found that there was enough circumstantial evidence to support a search of both girls. Furthermore,

125. See id. at 457-58.
126. 936 F.2d 881 (6'h Cir. 1991).
127. See id. at 883.
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the court held that the scope of the search-a strip search-was
reasonable because the vial that had been found was so small it
could have been hidden in underclothing. It is significant that
prior to the Sixth Circuit's addressing of the circumstances in
Williams, it was privy to the Seventh Circuit's holding regarding drug testing in Schaill by Kross v. Tippecanoe County
School Corporation, 128 but the court seemed to rely completely
on the T.L. 0. decision.
F. RANDOM, SUSPICION-LESS DRUG TESTING

In light of the increased use of the T.L. 0. reasonableness
test, an accelerated focus from lockers to pockets to test tubes
became a reality. In the years that followed, the idea of drug
testing by urinalysis came to the forefront of the Fourth
Amendment debate. The Supreme Court found random,
suspicion-less drug testing was justified in several cases including Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives' Association in 1989. 129
Skinner, a railroad worker's case, presented the Court with
a significant opportunity to apply the T.L.O. analysis to a nonschool setting that required the application of the special needs
exception. The policy in question required train operators and
personnel in certain levels of control to undergo urinalysis and
possibly blood testing in the event of any reported mishap.
The Court discussed at length the intrusive nature of the
test in comparison with the employees' diminished expectation
of privacy from working in a highly regulated field. It considered the lack of individualized suspicion in comparison with the
prevailing public need for safety in passenger train operation. 130
In the end, the factors of public need and a diminished expectation of privacy led the Court to uphold the policy, despite the
lack of a warrant, probable cause, individualized suspicion, or
even the theory of in loco parentis. 131
Even prior to the final Skinner holding, court decisions
nation-wide began to point toward Supreme Court approval of
intrusive drug testing. It is no surprise that approval was given

128.
129.
130.
131.

864 F.2d 1309 (7'h Cir. 1988).
489 U.S. 602 (1989).
See id. at 620.

See id.
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in Skinner and other cases. 132 Meanwhile, courts across the
country were addressing the issue of drug testing in public
schools. One such issue came to a head in the Seventh Circuit
decision regarding the Tippecanoe County School Corporation
in Indiana. 133
15.

The Schaill Decision

The Tippecanoe County School Corporation (TSC) operates
two high schools in Indiana. In the spring of 1986, the baseball
coach, at McCutcheon High School, received information leading him to suspect that some of his baseball team might be
involved in drug use. The coach ordered urinalysis for sixteen
players. No objections of any consequence were noted. From the
samples taken, five of the sixteen players were found to be using marijuana. Based on those findings and other suspicion
that drug abuse was a growing problem in the athletic program
generally, the TSC Board of Trustees decided to institute a
random urine testing program for interscholastic athletes and
cheerleaders within the TSC school system.
Because the Vernonia program instituted in 1995 so closely
mirrors the TSC drug testing program, there are significant
details that deserve mentioning. However, the details of its
implementation are reserved for discussion under the Vernonia
decision. In the spring of 1987, Darcy Schaill and Shelley Johnson were fifteen-year-old sophomores at Harrison High School,
which TSC also operated. Shelley had been a member of the
Varsity Swim Team as a freshman. Both students attended an
informational meeting prior to the 1987 school year where they
learned of the drug testing program and both decided that they
would not participate in school athletics if a signed consent
form for random drug testing was required for participation. As
soon as the school began the testing program, the students filed
their claim.

132. See National Treasury Employee Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656, 672
(1989).
133. See Schaill v. Tippecanoe County Sch. Corp., 864 F.2d 1309 (7 1h Cir. 1988).
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Analysis

The District Court denied the students' claims for declaratory and injunctive relief. They appealed to the Seventh Circuit
Court. The court began its analysis by quickly deciding that
urine testing involves a search under the Supreme Court's interpretation of the Fourth Amendment in United States v.
Jacobsen, a decision which followed the Katz definition of
"search" very closely. 134 The Court held, without counter discussion, that the act of urination is one in which society recognizes
a reasonable expectation ofprivacy.
Having determined that the act of urination was a private
act, and that urine testing was a search, the court moved immediately to the effect of a signed waiver upon the constitutionality of the search. To determine this point, the court addressed
what level of suspicion was required in this circumstance.
While a warrant and probable cause discussion would normally
have followed, because of the Supreme Court's decision in
T.L.O., the Seventh Circuit felt no need to debate those requirements, and found instead that the requirements did not apply
in the public school setting. This effectively dissolved the appellants' broadest attack against the school board.
Finding no requirement of suspicion meant that the remaining inquiry need only focus on the reasonableness of the test, as
the T.L. 0. decision had suggested. 135 The T.L. 0. requirement
was that the search be reasonable in its inception and in its
scope. Thus the Seventh Circuit addressed whether there was
good reason to enact a urine testing program in the school district, and whether it was reasonable in its policy of randomly
testing athletes and cheerleaders.
Reasonableness in this court's analysis fell into a two-part
test: 1) whether the individual being tested has a diminished
expectation of privacy because of their involvement in the athletic or cheerleading program, and 2) whether the government
interest in the testing was significant enough to outweigh the
intrusion. This analysis was drawn directly from the traditional
balancing test created in light of Katz which weighs intrusion

134. 466 U.S. 109, 113 (1984) ("[A] search occurs when an expectation of privacy
that society is prepared to consider reasonable is infringed").
135. See supra, note 120.
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against government interest. But this test was impacted severely by the school setting.
Because the process of obtaining urine samples was closely
guarded and the faculty member supervising the process was
positioned either behind the student or outside the bathroom
stall door, the immediate personal intrusion was considered to
be mitigated. Furthermore, because the test was reserved to
specific programs that carry a diminished sense or expectation
of privacy in their normal operations, the intrusion was mitigated even more. The Court reasoned that the athletes, and
presumably the cheerleaders, were accustomed to being in front
of others in locker rooms in a state of partial undress. Therefore, the intrusion was not considered in the same light as it
would have been in the case of a non-athlete.
Another factor in the diminished sense of privacy was the
high regulation of the activity by coaches and trainers. The fact
that parbcipation in the programs involved many rules of training and conduct seemed to weigh significantly on the court.
Also, the general societal recognition that drug abuse was a
growing problem in the area of professional and collegiate athletics and in the Olympic competition, convinced the court that
no student participating in the athletic program could have a
valid expectation of privacy.
In weighing the governmental interest, the Court's chief
considerations were the earlier findings by the baseball coach
at an adjoining school and the general concern nation-wide of a
growing drug problem. Additionally, the court recognized the
elevated stature of athletes and cheerleaders in the eyes of the
high school student body. In identifying a potentially serious
problem, the court held that the search was permissible both in
its inception and in its scope. It seemed to console itself in the
holding by noting that the information gathered in the testing
was only effective as to removing a student from the athletic
programs, not from school itself and not it was connected to
criminal prosecution.
In light of the Schaill holding, which was in direct conflict
with other decisions from other parts of the country relating to
very similar circumstances and claims, 136 it was inevitable that

136. See Brooks v. East Chambers Consol. lndep. Sch. Dist., 730 F. Supp. 759
(S.D. Texas 1989) (individualized suspicion was held to still be a requirement in
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the Supreme Court would address the issue of search and seizure in public schools again, in the context of drug testing. And
so it did in the 1995 Vernonia School District u. Acton case. 137
G. THE VERNONIA DECISION

In the early 1990s, in an isolated logging community in the
mountains of Oregon, the Vernonia School District operated one
high school and three grade schools. For many years, the District had been quiet and isolated-free from "big city" noise,
pollution and vice. But between 1980 and 1990, administrators
saw a marked increase in behavioral problems in the high
school. Some faculty members reported hearing drug-related
talk, and an increasing number of disciplinary incidents were
occurring. The faculty reported that the "[s]tudents became
increasingly rude during class; outbursts of profane language
became common." 138 A football and wrestling coach attributed a
sternum injury and some poor execution on the football field to
drug use.
Based on faculty observations, special programs were begun
wherein classes were offered and speakers were hired to talk
about drug use and attempt to deter the students from involvement. A drug-sniffing dog was also brought onto campus. 139
None of the administration's efforts worked. The court found
that the student body, "particularly those involved in
interscholastic athletics, was in a state of rebellion." 140 The
increased disciplinary problems in conjunction with language
and dress which the teachers and administration observed as
glamorizing a drug culture finally forced the District to assume
that the "rebellion" was being fueled by alcohol and drug abuse
and students' misconceptions about drug culture. 141
In 1988, the District officials began considering a drug-testing program. They held an open meeting for parental opinions
to discuss the proposed Drug Testing Policy. The parents attending the meeting gave their unanimous approval, and the

urinalysis).

137.
138.
139.
140.
141.

515 U.S. 646 (1995).

Id. at 649.
See id.
ld.

Id.
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School Board approved the policy for implementation in the
next fall, 1989. The express purpose of the policy was "to prevent student athletes from using drugs, to protect their health
and safety, and to provide drug users with assistance programs."142

17.

The Testing Policy

The policy implemented by the District was, in almost every
significant aspect, identical to the Tippecanoe County School
Corporation policy in the Schaill decision, announced earlier
that year. It is highly probable that the Vernonia District borrowed the policy directly from that decision because of its success on appeal in the Seventh Circuit Court. The only difference
worth noting between the two policies is the penalty portion.
The Vernonia policy gave the student athlete who tested positive the option of a six-week rehabilitative program and constant monitoring, or suspension for the remainder of the athletic season and the next season of any sport. A second failure
would automatically result in suspension. This would equate to
a maximum suspension from athletic participation of approximately six months unless the student failed another test. The
third failure resulted in suspension for the remainder of the
current athletic season and the next two seasons (a maximum
additional penalty of approximately nine months).
The Schaill program allowed for four failures and graduated
the suspension somewhat. Instead of losing the remainder of
the season on the first failure and the next two seasons on the
second failure, the Schaill test penalized the student by suspending him or her from one-third of the games on the first
offense, and one-half of the games on the second offense. The
third failure would mean no athletic participation for an academic year. The fourth offense resulted in a suspension for the
remainder of the student's high school years.
Two years after the implementation of the policy, James
Acton, then in seventh grade, signed up to play football in one
of the District's grade schools. But because he and his parents
had refused to sign the requisite consent forms, he was denied
participation. The Actons filed suit against the District, seeking

142. Id. at 650.
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injunctive relief from the policy which they claimed violated the
Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments of the U.S. Constitution
and two provisions of the Oregon State constitution.

18.

Analysis

Much like the circumstances and the testing program common to both the Schaill case and Vernonia, the formation of the
Supreme Court's decision closely mirrored the Seventh Circuit
reasoning as well. It proceeded almost identically: 1) finding
that urine testing is a search which animates a Fourth Amendment analysis, 2) applying the T.L.O. test for reasonableness in
inception and scope to determine the legality of the search, 3)
reiterating that a warrant and probable cause were not required after T.L.O., 4) finding that athletes share only a diminished sense of privacy, 5) finding that the test is conducted in
strict control, and 6) finding that the governmental interest is
substantial in light of the dangerous possibilities. 143
Perhaps most contrasted of all the arguments between
Schaill and Vernonia is the fact that the Supreme Court, after
finding that the T.L.O. decision eliminated the need for a warrant or probable cause in public school actions, went to comparatively great lengths to bolster that decision with the doctrine
of in loco parentis. The court restructured its earlier T.L.O.
rejection of the idea that school administrators acted under
parental authority by stating:
While denying that the State's power over schoolchildren is
formally no more than the delegated power of their parents,
T.L.O. did not deny, but indeed emphasized, that the nature of
that power is custodial and tutelary, permitting a degree of
supervision and control that could not be exercised over free
adults. 144

The Court went on to explain that although children do not
shed their rights at the school gates, the rights they carry are
not the same as those outside the school setting. 145 The case

143. For
see also Todd
WL334388.
144. 515
145. See

a summary of the Supreme Court's holding and analysis in Vernonia,
v. Rush County Sch., 139 F.3d 571-72 (7u-. Cir. 1998), cert. denied, 1998
U.S. 646 at 655.
id. at 656.
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cited as justification for that finding was Goss, where due process for a student challenging disciplinary suspension required
only that the teacher "informally discuss the alleged misconduct
with the student minutes after it has occurred." 146
In T.L.O. the Court argued that school officials were subject
to the "commands of the First Amendment," 147 and then entered
a discussion on the source of public school authority. The argument followed that because teachers had already been found to
be state actors for purposes of freedom of expression and due
process, they must be state actors for the purposes of privacy
rights.
The Court stated that the idea of parental delegation, as a
source of school authority, was "not entirely 'consistent with
compulsory education laws,' "148 and that school officials do not
exercise authority "voluntarily conferred on them by individual
parents," but in conducting disciplinary and search procedures,
the authorities "act as representatives of the State, not merely
as surrogates for the parents." 149
In Vernonia, the Court was faced with the necessity of justifying a much greater intrusion upon individual privacy rights
than was presented in T.L. 0. In light of that burden, it is not
surprising that the majority showed a renewed willingness to
embrace the doctrine of in loco parentis. The tenuous but crucial connection between a child's reduced expectation of privacy
in the home and the student's reduced expectations of privacy
in school was important in the Court's justification of an extension of the special needs exception introduced in T.L. 0.
The most significant of the comparative arguments, from
T.L.O. to Vernonia (and everything in between)/ 50 is the clear
indication that the courts are struggling to empower school
officials to effectively address rising threats to children. But the

146. Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 581-82 (1975).
147. New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 336 (1985) (citing Tinker).
148. Id.
149. Id. at 325.
150. Vernonia is susceptible to several different interpretations: (1) that "special
needs" justifying drug testing always exist in the public school context, and thus
school authorities may require drug testing for any reason including controlling access
to core classes; (2) that it is necessary to show a particularized governmental need
to impose drug testing on a particular student population; (3) that drug testing is
permitted in special scholastic environments in which the need is well identified and
the privacy expectations are diminished. Todd., 139 F.3d at 572.
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courts must find a means of doing so on the basis of available
case law. Thus, the Supreme Court, over ten years and a mountain of frightening statistics, applied every successful argument
from T.L.O., added several points from lower court decisions,
and then reversed its position on another issue in order to expand search and seizure in schools to include random,
suspicionless drug testing.

IV. CONCLUSION
From a constitutional point of view, the path created between T.L.O., Williams, Schaill, and Vernonia was particularly
intrusive upon individual privacy rights. Yet, the accelerated
incidence of drugs, weapons and even explosives entering public
schools in the 1990s makes it highly probable that the evolution
of search and seizure law will accelerate as well. 151 It is predictable, for example, that the criteria of a diminished sense of
privacy will be tested beyond athletics and cheerleading.

A. THE FUTURE OF SEARCH AND SEIZURE IN PUBLIC SCHOOL
The next steps in search and seizure law for public schools
will be toward broader regulation with less requirements of
individualized or even focused suspicion. 152 This is witnessed by
the present reality of metal detectors at school entrances and
school-wide book bag checks in many inner-city public
schools. 153 These programs are justified by the need to raise
student protections, but ironically, serve to lower students'
expectations of privacy as well as their constitutional
protections of that interest. Thus, students who are not involved in athletics or cheerleading might be seen as having a
lesser expectation of privacy. The presence and implementation
of such precautions emphasize the unique safety and disciplinary concerns in public schools, while at the same time, bolster

151. See id. at 571-72 (7'h Cir. 1998), cert. denied 1998 WL334388 (holding that
Vernonia could not be interpreted as meaning all children are subject to testing all
the time).
152. See Chandler v. Miller, 520 U.S. 305 (1997) (holding that drug testing of
electoral candidates for public office was not justified because the targeted group was
not found to have a high degree of drug use or to perform safety-related tasks
justifying such scrutiny).
153. See In the Interest of S.S., W.L. 39, 2112 (Penn. 1996).
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the Vernonia argument that students cannot be given the same
rights that adults have.

19.

Plausible Scenarios

These searches involve no individualized suspicion, and are
deemed reasonable in inception and scope because of the increased rate of violence and drug use in schools. As the drug
problem is recognized as more inclusive than merely an athletic
dilemma, it is foreseeable that school-wide drug testing could
be introduced, coinciding with school-wide bag searches and
metal detectors. These drug tests would be found reasonable
because of both the perceived threat of drugs and the diminished expectation of privacy in every student who has undergone the other searches in the past.
This is but one scenario of many that are plausible. Others
would include the testing of particular student clubs upon evidence that there is a drug problem or the random testing or
general searching of participants at school dances or athletic
events. It is also conceivable that school officials, given ever
increasing latitude in the exercise of search and seizure, may
abuse the authority for their own perverse or otherwise manipulative purposes. In any of these scenarios, the base has already been laid by T.L.O. and its progeny. After the liberal
application of the T.L.O. reasonableness test in Vernonia, few
courts will question a school official's increased regulation as
long as there exists some statistical or testimonial evidence of
an increased problem with discipline, drugs or violence. Unfortunately, the increased power of school officials may also mean
a decreased expectation of privacy on the part of students, and
a diminished sense of outrage at what would have been outright
abuses of constitutional rights a few years ago.
Clearly, proving a governmental need has proven the easiest
hurdle in almost all of the preceding analyses. In T.L. 0., on the
basis of one noted study presented to Congress, it was found
reasonable to permit immediate and more aggressive supervision and discipline in the school. In Vernonia, without a single
school-specific test that showed that the athletes were involved
in drug abuse to a higher degree than other students, it was
found that because of increased discipline problems schoolwide, and by virtue of their roles as leaders in the school, their
urine could be taken and tested at random. In all of the signifi-
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cant cases, the government need was found to outweigh the
level of intrusion upon the individual.
Here, another factor must be considered in the discussion of
justified searches; that of less-intrusive testing. It is likely that
as testing procedures advance to the analysis of fingernails and
hair rather than urine or blood, the intrusiveness of the test
will be considered reduced. At that point it is not likely to matter whether the student has participated in locker room settings of partial undress. The fact that he or she attends public
school, with its metal detectors zero-tolerance policies, and
armed policemen will lead to the assumption that there is no
longer a reasonable expectation of privacy in a student's hair or
finger nails and that testing those items is so easily and accurately done, that it is justifiable in scope. While this advance
and acceptance would eliminate some of the physical intrusion
of urine sampling, the information contained in hair and fingernails must still be protected, unless at some point students are
perceived as having no privacy rights at all.

B.

WHAT TO EXPECT FROM PUBLIC SCHOOL AND AT WHAT COST

Parents who contemplate enrolling their child in public
schools are now forced to consider more factors than parents
considered ten, five or even two years ago. They must weigh the
increased risks of the public school environment with the increased cost of avoiding them, by using a private school or home
schooling. Those costs cannot be measured in dollars alone. No
parent withdraws their child from public school without considering the social, intellectual, creative, and athletic losses which
could follow.
On another level, instead of considering the quality of faculty, parents can be expected to review the known or publicized
incidents demonstrating a pattern of conduct of school officials
in regard to discipline and search and seizure. Because the
majority of what would be made public through various media
is apt to be exceptional and thus sensational, the perspective of
a concerned parent may be far from accurate. However, the fact
that the public might be misinformed is not sufficient, at any
level of advocacy, to sooth the protective passion of individual
parents. Few parents would choose a school based upon the
relative chances of their child being caught and disciplined for
drug or weapon possession. But most parents, knowing their
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child, and desiring to protect the child from embarrassment or
humiliation, would reasonably wonder if such policies might
harm their child, especially if mis-applied to collusive or destructive purposes.
It might be said that public education, tied as it is to funds
from the citizens' purse and weighted with such a public charter, is of all creatures in our society the most reluctant in progress, the most clumsy in change and yet a most accurate measure of our nation's values and priorities. Because justification
for expanding search and seizure in public schools is found in
the fundamental yet overwhelming considerations of the moral
and physical safety of our children, it is not likely that the
courts will alter the course of that law until society alters the
course of education. And yet, it is difficult to imagine that
change.
The environment within a public school, for the same reasons, is a direct reflection of social priorities and problems. The
history of search and seizure in public schools illustrates the
effort in public education to balance a fundamental charter to
educate against ever-pressing threats to physical and moral
well being. The school, with finite resources, cannot take from
one effort without compromising the other. And a compromise
on either hand invites a tragedy.
Thus, while drug abuse, social diseases, and violence become the preoccupation of communities, the school's priorities
flow increasingly toward protection, and less toward education.
As parents sending children off each morning, it is doubtful
that we would have the school swap those priorities. After all,
with few exceptions, we are more moved by the immediacy of
physical dangers to our children than intellectual threats.
Having admitted as much, it behooves us to ask ourselves
what we expect of public education, and at what price? This
analysis was undertaken in pursuit of perspective on a single
issue oflaw in public education; search and seizure. The factors
that a parent must weigh in deciding whether or not to enroll or
leave their child in public school vary for each parent and each
child and are much more broad than this single issue. In that
context, search and seizure law, with its court-imposed balancing tests, merely supplies a measure of public priorities. It
marks the personal intrusions we will tolerate in the interest of
security. It measures our common fears as accurately as it mea-
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sures personal liberties. In the school setting it may not tell all
we need to know about the status or course of public education,
but perhaps it tells enough.

